

When Security Paradigms Clash: Why Israel's National Security Strategy is a Recipe for Disaster The Gaza Case in Point

David Kreider¹

INTRODUCTION

This paper was conceived several months before the events which followed December 27, 2008 in Gaza began to unfold. I was concerned about the dire situation there and the economic siege which over the last three years since Hamas came to power in June 2006 has reduced this, the most densely populated place on earth to a full-blown humanitarian disaster. These days, now three weeks into Israel's brutal War on the 1.5 million people of Gaza, "Operation Cast Lead," have been excruciating for my wife and I as we've watched this punishing attack intensify.

My wife and I grew up across these lines and we carry deep sympathies for friends and acquaintances on both sides. While it has been difficult for me to filter the raw edges of my feelings from what we see and hear in the news, this paper has been a blessing as I've gathered my wits to make sense of it in some way. This conflict is as complex and intractable as they come, yet for all its complexity, it was sadly predictable. What is yet more disconcerting is that the clouds of contributing factors are darkening, and the precious prize of security and peace which Israelis and Palestinians and the people of the entire region most crave is more than ever, a deteriorating proposition. We must understand these contravening dynamics and turn the tide on what will otherwise be written as one of history's cruelest ironies of interwoven victimizations and trauma, traumas that have multiplied here several times over like a spreading cancer that have intensified man's inhumanity to man. In this place violence continues to beget violence, and trauma trauma on more and more undeserving people who want nothing more than a decent life for their children.

As I've studied international development from the perspective of peacebuilding, I am beginning to see what I believe is a dark subplot which if understood may also hold the key to transformation and hope. There is in the conceptual world of human security a cognitive disconnect between the premises of two powerful interdependent paradigms, those of military defense strategy and those of social and economic development. Both have to do with the establishment and preservation of social order, justice, and peace - fundamental underpinnings of security. The case study at hand is a classic example of what happens when these conceptual paradigms are set at odds. The basic challenge distills to one of anemic definitions: "security" has traditionally been conceived by political states exclusively in military terms, and "development" myopically as merely socio-economic "relief" programs designed to lift underdeveloped communities from poverty. Neither definition recognizes the interdependence of

1

David Kreider, MA in Peacebuilding and Conflict Transformation is a Research Associate for the Center for Justice and Peacebuilding at Eastern Mennonite University, Harrisonburg, Virginia. He is currently involved in the development of the Center for Studies in the Abrahamic Traditions and has focused his analysis and research on various aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This paper was written during Israel's attack on Gaza and was completed January 20, 2009.

these variables in the security equation or the magnitude, their potential influence on each other, and the power of their capacity in collaboration for peace.

I would like to reflect on the intersection of these two paradigms, particularly from a development perspective, and consider what can happen when they are set at odds. I will begin by talking about development and its objectives and theoretical principles for social change. I will move on to outline a theoretical framework for development as a security strategy and reflect on these interconnected paradigms as they are integrated in the United States national security strategies of 2002 and 2006. I will contrast Israel's national security strategy, reflect on its application to the occupied territories over the past 41 years, and analyze its social and economic impact from a "Do No Harm" development framework. Finally, I will make the connection to Israel's administrative policies and War in Gaza these past three weeks, and close with several conclusions and recommendations which point to what I believe can transform these clashing paradigms into a collaborative engagement for an integrated political and economic just peace.

I. WHAT IS DEVELOPMENT?

Overview:

Simply put, *development is about creating a just, productive, and well-functioning social, economic, and political order. As such, it is directly related to a society's sense of social wellbeing and security.* This, in a nutshell, is also the intersection point and the defining interdependent relationship between these two paradigms of **development** and **security**.

Theories as to *how* development goes about creating a just social order, *why* it does so, and *what* the primary issues and obstacles are to the work of development, have given rise to several theoretical development paradigms including *modernization*, *growth-with-equity*, and *liberation-from-dependency*¹. My focus here falls in the liberation framework with a disposition toward what Vernon Jantzi calls a fourth paradigm – that of "*global interdependence*" (Desanto, et al, 1990). It is not in the scope of this paper to define and nuance these. I want simply to reference for the reader versed in development theory the position I am taking by way of an intervention. I am suggesting that conflict transformation in this instance must be achieved at least in part through *liberation* from *unjust social orders* that limit development and compromise the broader foundations of security. This paradigm generally pits the development practitioner in an adversarial role with respect to systems that have through exploitation pushed the gap between adversaries – in this case between the powerful and the powerless, the rich and poor, the oppressor and the oppressed, wider (61). The orientation of liberation in its best sense is positive, inclusive, participatory, and transformative (Jantzi and Jantzi), and as such it *is my hope that this analysis will point to an integration of these paradigms into a constructive interaction for the Israeli-Palestinian context that can be collaborative and mutually productive in the interests of security, economic prosperity, and a satisfying political and social coexistence between these present adversaries.*

The Positive Orientation of Development

Development addresses the needs of a society for education, healthcare, employment, and democratic institutions and provides resources to help people help themselves in these areas. As such, development at its best works *with* people rather than merely throwing money at them or

doing things *for* them. Development is oriented towards improvement of people's quality of life and addressing basic needs. As such it is about economic, social, and political wellbeing, and about constructive, positive change towards a just and prosperous social order. It is also oriented towards building positive relationships or social capital (Halpern, 2005) between people which strengthens social resilience, cohesion, and collaborative energy for the good of society. Investing in the promotion of this kind of change suggests an orientation towards building a better world, and assumes collaboration and an integration of harmonious governance and social institutions between the unit segments of a society. As such *development represents a countervailing force against conflict and social injustice.*

Development programs target social problems and grievances, engaging people who are living in poverty, and in situations of limited opportunity, to improve their lives. Where people simply need resources or knowledge to help themselves, development has worked to provide these resources. Where oppressive structures have contributed to these problems, development has focused its attention on liberating people from these structures. To be effective and sustainable, development looks at the big picture to address the systemic and root causes of social inequalities that contribute to conflict. In this respect, *development is fundamentally about peacebuilding.*

Where people have access to jobs and economic opportunity, basic healthcare, education, the ability to participate in the governing processes that affect them, basic rights, and dignity people are less prone to conflict. People who have jobs and who have invested in their social structures have a stake in their societies and ownership in making better lives for themselves and their children. They will harbor fewer grievances and tend to work to strengthen the social and economic milieu in which they work rather than bring it down. *Development thus becomes an integral part of a society's internal security.*

II. DEVELOPMENT AS A KEY COMPONENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY²

The case for development as a key component of an integrated national security strategy is summed up in the United States National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006. The introductory paragraph of the 2002 US National Security Strategy Document reads as follows:

“Helping the world's poor is a strategic priority and a moral imperative. Economic development, responsible governance, and individual liberty are intimately connected. [...] The United States must promote development programs that achieve measurable results – rewarding reforms, encouraging transparency, and improving people's lives. Led by the United States, the international community has endorsed this approach in the Monterrey Consensus.”³

The Monterrey Consensus was drafted by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division of Sustainable Development, to which the United States was a primary signatory, affirmed the collective value and resolve of its cosignatories in pursuing the following:

“to address the challenges of ...development around the world, particularly in developing countries. Our goal is to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth and promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive and equitable global economic system. ...Achieving the internationally agreed development goals, including

those contained in the Millennium Declaration, demands a new partnership between developed and developing countries. We commit ourselves to sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law. We also commit ourselves to mobilizing domestic resources, attracting international flows, promoting international trade as an engine for development, increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development, sustainable debt financing and external debt relief, and enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international monetary, financial and trading systems.”⁴

Recognizing that peace and development are mutually reinforcing, we are determined to pursue our shared vision for a better future, through our individual efforts combined with vigorous multilateral action. Upholding the Charter of the United Nations and building upon the values of the Millennium Declaration, we commit ourselves to promoting national and global economic systems based on the principles of justice, equity, democracy, participation, transparency, accountability and inclusion.”(Monterrey Consensus, 2002)⁵

Development is clearly understood in the above two documents as integral to the avoidance of conflict and the promotion of a comprehensive national security strategy. Lisa Schirch in talking about the interrelationship of development, diplomacy, and defense says it this way “In an interdependent world, helping others ultimately ends up helping ourselves.”⁶ The US National Security Strategy statement of 2006 includes the following additional argument:

“The United States has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests. It reflects our values because we believe the desire for freedom lives in every human heart and the imperative of human dignity transcends all nations and cultures. [...] Governments that honor their citizens' dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct toward other nations, while governments that brutalize their people also threaten the peace and stability of other nations. [...] Promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.”

The US National Security Strategy goes on to make the following pertinent statements to this case study. I want to reference this here for what it represents as a glaring contradiction to Israel's National Security Strategy as applied to her occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.

“Tyranny is the combination of brutality, poverty, instability, corruption, and suffering, forged under the rule of despots and despotic systems. [...] In today's world, no tyrant's rule can survive without the support or at least the tolerance of other nations. To end tyranny we must summon the collective outrage of the free world against the oppression, abuse, and impoverishment that tyrannical regimes inflict on their people – and summon their collective action against the dangers tyrants pose to the security of the world.”

The relationship between economic development and national security has been outlined in this summary statement of the US National Security Strategy of both 2002 and 2006:

In effective democracies, freedom is indivisible. Political, religious, and economic liberty advance together and reinforce each other. [...] Political progress can be jeopardized if

economic progress does not keep pace. We will harness the tools of economic assistance, development aid, trade, and good governance to help ensure that new democracies are not burdened with economic stagnation or endemic corruption.”⁷ Economic freedom is a moral imperative. The liberty to create and build, or to buy, sell, and own property is fundamental to human nature and foundational to a free society. Economic freedom also reinforces political freedom.”⁸

“Effective economic development advances our national security by helping promote responsible sovereignty, not permanent dependency. Weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas are not only a threat to their people and a burden on regional economies, but are also susceptible to exploitation by terrorists, tyrants, and international criminals. We will work to bolster threatened states, provide relief in times of crisis, and build capacity in developing states to increase their progress.”⁹

Development as a Countervailing Force to Terrorism

Terrorism has become a major concern for both Israelis and Americans as a direct result of their strategic relationship. Addressing terrorism requires an understanding of its root causes. If we consider the contexts where extremism has been nurtured we find they thrive in environments of social discontent where the larger society sympathizes with their anger, resentment, and sense of desperation. Generally their grievances stem from frustration and hopelessness in the face of persistent poverty, oppression, stigmatization, ostracism, humiliation, and disenfranchisement from political, judicial, social or economic processes to resolve their grievances.

Alleviating these frustrations and grievances by creating channels to address their concerns goes a long way towards diffusing the driving motivations that nurture extremism and resorts to violence. Investment in economic development that provides productive employment, education, vocational training, micro-loans, etc gives people hope for their future and a sense of dignity as they invest themselves in society. Inclusion of those otherwise disenfranchised in all aspects of the social enterprise including having a say in governance alleviates frustrations otherwise harbored by those who have been marginalized. *This is fundamentally an investment in security - when people have a stake in making the social enterprise in which they are members, work and thrive.* Ultimately this leads to a transformation of alienation into positive social capital as members of a social network share common interests and collaborate in their collective future.

III. ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

The Challenge:

The origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict one may argue go back as early as 1907 and continue through the years leading up to 1948. It was over these years that Jews for a variety of reasons began immigrating to Palestine in search of sanctuary from anti-Semitism and the Nazi holocaust. Among them were several armed Zionist groups, including Hashomer (formed in 1909) which became the Haganah (in 1920), and later the Irgun (in 1931) and Palmach (1939), who by rallying the growing Jewish population in Palestine took control of the land by various means including force, deception¹⁰ and purchase, both legitimate, but also in time, after 1948, via controversial claims to “eminent domain” or through “absentee

landlord” sales that ultimately became part of the Jewish State.

Since its establishment as a state in 1948, Israel has as a result lived in an environment of nearly unremitting hostility. Repeated wars, perpetual animosities from Palestinians internally and externally who became refugees, the failed peace processes with the Palestinians and Syria, and even the “cold” peace with Egypt and Jordan, have reinforced this image. As a result, national security has been at the forefront of the Israeli ethos for six decades. Israel has responded by developing a monumental national security establishment and taken security concerns into its consideration on every matter of state importance. In the West Bank and Gaza significant tracts of Palestinian land have also been taken over or rendered inaccessible for security reasons, or designated as “security zones” by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). These policies, along with often brutally repressive military actions to stem Palestinian outbursts of violence or protest, have added to the hostilities that constitute Israel's security concerns.

The emergence of the Israeli military ethos:

Israel, as I have noted, lives surrounded by generally disapproving Arab neighbors, and internally with a resentful Palestinian population, 3.8 million of whom are living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. We should note also that Israel's Jewish population as well is at odds - as to what Israel represents as a Jewish State, what its agendas should be to achieve security and legitimacy as a state. Zeev Maoz, in his *Defending the Holy Land* offers this reflection:

“[T]he material and human asymmetry between Israel and the Arab World [has] indicated that the Arabs had the potential capabilities for annihilating the State of Israel... There is no question that this was and to some extent still is a genuine perception at both the elite and mass levels.” (2006, 545).

This perception has driven Israeli and world Jewry towards a “no holds barred” approach to secure their existence and security. The challenge of maintaining what has been a delicate balance of both international support and physical control of the political forces at play in this charged environment is not an easy one. Security has been a vital and often elusive national interest that carries all the hallmarks of a national obsession.

Israel's Development as a State

Not only have security concerns defined Israeli politics and military science, Zeev Maoz argues this perception was turned into the driving force of Israel's development impulse as well. He suggests that the common values of the IDF as “a symbol of statehood, nationalism, and Israelism,” became a more powerful mobilizing instrument than Judaism itself. For Israel's elite, it was a more pragmatic instrument than religiosity to forge a new society. In the social unit of the kibbutz they constructed a social framework for survival based on defense. These rugged resourceful agrarian communal settlements were self-sufficient cohesive communities of shared life existing as border outposts oriented toward serving as the first line of defense for the homeland. Israeli society became integrated around this model, and it evolved into part of the ethos of Israeli social identity.¹¹

Maoz identifies four contributing factors that led to the development of *militarism as the*

predominant social motivator and state-building force in Israel: “(1) building a fully mobilized society through a system of general conscription and a large reserve force; (2) maintaining the conflict on a back burner, thus cultivating a permanent siege mentality; (3) using the IDF as an instrument of political legitimacy by creating a stratified military force; and (4) engaging the IDF in social and state-building projects” (2006, 582). Israel’s siege and security mentality is deeply militaristic and embedded in her social-psychological fabric. “As long as the widespread belief that Israel was engaged in a long term existential struggle persisted, the Israeli public – in spite of its deep social and religious divisions – pulled together to advance national goals” (584). Not only this, but the IDF has taken a predominate role in setting policy decisions for the state in political matters. This has had a serious impact on Israel’s efforts in peacemaking as well as its policies in administering the Occupied Territories (Maoz, 2006, 573).

The Development of Israel’s Military Security Strategy

As a result, when Israel has felt threatened by Palestinian resistance, Israeli impulses have been to tighten security in military terms. This has manifested itself in frequent and often excessive use of force, arrests, detentions, erections of security walls and fences, land confiscation for “security zones,” checkpoints to monitor passage of goods and personnel, barricades to restrict “dangerous traffic”, exclusive-use roads for Israeli settlers in the OTs, establishment of extensive inspection and clearance procedures for commercial shipments through Israel, restrictions on land use and construction permits, harsh penalties for resistance such as house demolitions, subjection to random search and seizure, closures of borders to commercial goods, denial of visas and permits for travel, and subjection of Palestinians to extended and cumbersome legal processes in filing for grievances.

De-Development as a Weapon of War:

It seems apparent that Israel has, in the name of military security, created an administrative and legal structure in the Occupied Territories, and particularly in Gaza that could not be more counterproductive to economic viability for the Palestinians. While she has taken great pains to “justify” her actions as legitimate to protect Israeli citizens from suicide bombers, the results could not be more obvious as a deterrence policy. Israel’s house demolitions, for example, in response to suicide bombings, are clearly designed to inflict severe costs to family members who may not be complicit, in order to create negative consequences by association for the perpetrator and their families. The IDF and whatever authorities involved have confiscated Palestinian land, bulldozed down Palestinian homes, and set up fences and the Separation Barrier, again “in the name of security.” The course of the Barrier (a huge concrete wall) and settler-only access roads run through Palestinian land frequently separating farmers from their fields and orchards. While the strategy is slightly different in the West Bank (where the territory is divided by fences and checkpoints into an array of cantons) compared to the Gaza Strip which is closed off by a single encompassing wall with an Orwellian checkpoint all of which reduce passage to a snails pace and a series of logistical restrictions so cumbersome and expensive in time and money and humiliation as to basically reduce economic trade to nearly a trickle. If one were to design a system to suffocate a population it could not be more perfectly contrived. Israel maintains it is essential to inspect everyone and everything passing through, considering virtually no one

worthy of trust.

Israel's National Security: a Strategy in Crisis

The Lebanon War of 2006 fundamentally altered the national security equation for Israel by revealing several things: Firstly, despite the all-out unleashing of Israel's formidable and sophisticated military and intelligence capabilities against Hezbollah, Israel was unable to achieve any of her objectives. In fact, Hezbollah was able in the aftermath, by virtue of its social network of relief aid assistance from Iran to respond with recovery assistance to the people of Lebanon that made this punishing and brutal act Israeli aggression look all the more illegitimate and offensive, not only in the eyes of the Arab World but on the international stage. Secondly, this was a diplomatic embarrassment to the United States, her sole ally, who also lost stature and legitimacy by virtue of an implied complicity with Israel's disproportionate show of force.

In April 2007, one of Israel's highly-regarded think tanks, the Reut Institute¹² sent an analysis document to the Winograd Committee¹³ (charged with investigating the Lebanon War of 2006) which included the following assessment of Israel's national security:

Israel has no comprehensive national security strategy that blends politics and security. Often, Israel has no real diplomatic agenda that is backed by political, economic and military resources. [...]Furthermore, a tremendous gap exists between the resources allocated to military build-up and the resources that are allocated to developing 'soft power' of diplomacy, economics, trade, or media. Furthermore, the access of the security establishment to the Prime Minister is far greater than the access of other systems. Therefore, it should be no surprise that security and military considerations often dominate the design of our national security.

The Second Lebanon War is ...one of three political and military upsets that Israel experienced in 2006... Their common denominator is that they derive from a crisis in Israel's national security strategy ...[and] revealed trends, which undermine Israel's national security strategy. Some of these trends are: the consolidation of a 'Resistance Network' led by Iran, Hizbollah, and the Palestinian resistance groups, that effectively undermine any sustainable political or military achievement that would secure Israel's existence as a Jewish and democratic state; decline of US power in the region and the challenge to the legitimacy of the pro-Israel lobby in the US; the rise of Iran; and the erosion in the ability or will of the Arab side to fulfill its part in ending Israeli control over the Palestinian population in the West Bank [and Gaza].

These trends place Israel in strategic inferiority on the level of its national security. Concepts, institutions and tools that Israel uses in the service of its national goals are exposed as inferior to the tools used by the Resistance Network in the service of its logic. Therefore, in the intermediate term, Israel is likely to experience additional military and political setbacks." (Reut Institute, 2007)¹⁴

Implications

This assessment, while it does not explicitly share the language of development, points to the fundamental concerns that development is about: namely, the domains of economics,

and the political currencies of diplomacy and good governance. These in the conceptual framework of the US National Security Strategy have a great deal to do with security. It appears that Reut is recognizing to some degree the strategic role of these components. It is not evident however, that they are appreciated to the extent conceived in the US National Security Strategy of 2006.

The dynamic interaction between development and security must be reconfigured to work in concert. A just social order is the foundation of social stability. Otherwise conflict is inevitable. This is ultimately the fatal flaw in Israel's National Security Strategy. As it stands, it is an orientation that does not move in the direction of diffusing conflict by addressing its root causes but toward its perpetuation and intensification by virtue of adding to the power, social and economic disparities and structural and systemic injustices that are part-and-parcel of the conflict. I want to examine these disparities and then reflect on the implications these represent.

IV. THE SEEDS OF DISCONTENT IN GAZA¹⁵

In September 2007, the World Bank described the changing course of the Palestinian economy since 2000 as moving from one driven by investment and private sector productivity to one sustained primarily by government spending and donor aid. Towards the end of the 1990s, Gaza's delicate though relatively well-functioning economy entered a gradual downward cycle as a result of several crises, security constrictions, and growing economic dependence. As economic opportunities in the private sector shriveled, the young, rapidly growing labor force has turned to the public sector in pursuit of work to stave off poverty. As a result investment in what would normally be more productive growth areas weakened. The downturn intensified most markedly for Gaza following the elections that brought Hamas into a more prominent position in the Palestinian political mix, and ultimately in June 2007, when Hamas took control of the government. Israel responded with an economic embargo and blockade which has put Gaza under a state of siege for the past 18 months.

Reform and development initiatives of the Palestinian economy have been pursued through programs overseen by the World Bank in conjunction with the Palestinian Authority's (PA) Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP). The PA has operated under the leadership of Fatah in West Bank and thus since 2007 the PRDP has had limited effect in Gaza. To succeed, the PRDP was to be underwritten by donors and supported by Israeli efforts to loosen restrictions on the movement of goods and people within and out of the West Bank and Gaza. *It has been the consensus of analysis that aid remains critical to ensure the survival of Palestinian institutions that underpin the peace process.* As it stands, this development aid has not reached Gaza beyond a bare minimum allowed by Israel to avoid a "humanitarian crisis."

Real GDP growth in Gaza has been estimated at 0 percent since 2007, which when adjusted for the rapid population growth indicates falling per capita income. Unemployment has grown from 33 percent in 2007 to a staggering 45 percent as of late 2008, the highest in the world according to UN assessments. Continued Israeli closures of access in and out of Gaza since June, 2007 have eroded the private sector backbone of the Gazan economy and are increasingly difficult to reverse. Poverty rose from nearly 35% in 2006 to an equivalent

of around 67% in 2007-2008¹⁶.

Gaza's private sector economies are not sustainable under closure. These restrictions have resulted in the suspension of nearly 98 percent¹⁷ of Gaza's industrial operations. Gaza's economy now consists of public sector salaries and humanitarian aid. Reduction in fuel allowances into Gaza has impacted remaining industries and donor projects, virtually incapacitating them.¹⁸ Israel's selective allowances of goods in are not conducive to most industrial operations. While allowances for cement, gravel, steel bars, pipes, spare parts, wood, etc. allow for a measure of construction, over 90% of imports remain humanitarian items.

Israel's blockade has resulted in the collapse of the municipal sector as well. Services such as water, sewage, solid waste etc. are in crisis. The impoverishment of the population has left the municipalities unable to collect fees and to pay staff salaries. They have also been unable to import parts and supplies to maintain their operations in water purification and sanitation. Fuel shortages have resulted in curtailed production of electricity, shortages of clean water, the use of vegetable oil to run vehicles, the accumulation of 600 tons of garbage per day on city streets, and dumping of 70-80 million liters of raw or partially treated sewage into the Mediterranean Sea each day. A growing number of cases of bacterial meningitis in Gazan hospitals have been documented as a result. This constitutes a water and sanitation crisis according to UN assessments. Gaza relies on wells increasingly infiltrated by seawater due to over-pumping. Apart from extensive and immediate development projects to mitigate this need UN estimates that within the next 15 years Gaza will have no drinking water.

Health and education services are also in crisis. Conditions have led 50 percent of health workers to resort to striking for back pay. Most Gaza hospitals are only providing emergency services, with about 40 percent of health workers reporting to work. Similarly in the education sector, 40 percent of teachers are resorting to other options to cope with no pay. Student attendance is reportedly running between 50-80 percent.

Israel's blockade has thwarted the efforts of donors and development agencies to offer assistance¹⁹ and constitutes an 'impermeable barrier' to Palestinian economic growth (World Bank, 2008). This includes:

- **Access to Economies of Scale:** to produce necessary incentives for business growth and new investors. Over 95% of Gaza's businesses employ 10 persons or less.
- **Access to Natural Resources:** including land, water, cultural sites amenable to tourism, and telecommunications radio frequencies.
- **Access to an Investment Horizon:** including supply chains and stable predictable markets, necessary permits and visas for local and foreign investors to conduct business.

Finally, Israeli authorities have created nearly impossible hurdles for family reunifications in the Territories. This undermines the networks of social capital essential to the health and wellbeing of any society. By all accounts in studies of poverty, social capital is the most fundamental resource for resilience in the face of adversity (Narayan, 2000).

V. A DEVELOPMENT "DO NO HARM" ANALYSIS

The litmus test of successful development, and of aid given in support of it, is that it produces no adverse unintended consequences. This is typically evaluated by development

practitioners according to the conceptual framework outlined by Mary Anderson called “Do No Harm” (1999). Anderson’s “Do No Harm” analysis of the Israeli Occupied Territories yielded the following summary conclusion:

Everyone with whom I spoke, without exception (international, Palestinian, Israeli), agreed that donor assistance to the Occupied Palestinian Territories plays into and reinforces the Israeli Occupation of Palestine. People noted that aid “relieves Israel of its obligations as an occupier,” that it “rebuilds whatever Israel destroys” and “enables” the continuation of such actions, that currently, it simply “maintains” levels of poverty resulting from a strict closure regime and other aspects of Israeli control by providing major financial resources for food, employment, etc. With this agreement, however, there was widely shared discomfort over its implications. Most people felt that they faced two extreme options – either to continue to provide assistance and, thus, support the Occupation or pull out altogether. No one liked these two bad options.²⁰

The lack of progress in resolving the current stalemate is the foremost obstacle to Palestinian economic development. Conditions have never been more dire. Resolving this conflict and humanitarian disaster will hinge on an examination of the potentials that exist in a shared future. A comparative analysis of connectors and dividers reflects the following:

Connectors:

Desire for peace
 Religious values of compassion, justice and mercy
 Common historical, cultural, spiritual roots as Abrahamic faiths
 Belief in the same God and prophetic tradition and teachings
 Common linguistic roots, common words
 Shared sacred ties to the land
 Sacred ties to Jerusalem and religious sites
 Desire for economic prosperity
 Desire for mutual trust
 Desire for dignity and respect
 Economic interdependence
 Exhaustion from war and violence
 Recognition that fighting each other has not resolved injustices and grievances
 Sense of hopelessness/pessimism/despair
 Shared stress, including post-traumatic stress and perpetrator-induced stress
 Sense of collective shame for violence done to the other
 Majority community support for a two-state solution
 Majority consider rejectionist views ‘extremist’

Dividers:

Religious identities
 Different languages
 Individualist vs collectivist cultures
 Claims of exclusive “divine right” to land
 Different narratives of the conflict
Power differential militarily, economically
Humiliation, disrespect
Military occupation administration
Lack of equal economic opportunities
Palestinian poverty, sense of desperation
Economic siege, anger
Social isolation
Economic barriers
Differing access to water
Differing land use rights
Differing judicial treatment
Differing legal rights
Differing access to political process
Walls, fences, barriers to physical interaction
Differing control of and access to media
Checkpoints (humiliation, detainment, restrictions of passage, social connections, and economic opportunity for Palestinians)
Oppressive methodologies for social control
Fears of the other
Distrust of the other
Resentment of the other
Victimization by the other

While the list of dividers above is formidable, we must note how many of these are the result of actions taken by Israel as part of her “security measures” in the West Bank and

Gaza, which clash with the objectives of economic growth and development. I have identified these in italics. Studies show that communities that face these chronic issues are insecure because they harbor grievances, frustration, desperation to improve their lives and living conditions, and resentment against the obstacles that stand in their way. Reversing these would go a long way toward shifting the balance in their relationship away from animosity towards the common ground reflected in the connectors above.

VI. THE WAR ON GAZA

The War in Gaza has worsened the picture I've presented here by an order of magnitude beyond the conditions described above. "Collateral damage" in the wake of her "surgical strikes" on "known Hamas targets", has included schools, hospitals, mosques, police stations, countless residential apartment buildings and homes throughout Gaza and her refugee camps. BBC's Heather Sharp in Jerusalem filed this report January 10, 2009 entitled "The Humanitarian Crisis Deepens" :

"Gaza is "on the cusp of catastrophe", a senior UN official currently in Gaza City has said. Aid agencies say the already fragile humanitarian situation has deteriorated dramatically since Israel began its offensive. Israel has imposed a crippling blockade on Gaza for the past 18 months, allowing little more than humanitarian basics into the coastal territory.

Health, energy and water infrastructure were already close to breaking point before the fighting broke out. Now paramedics are struggling to secure safe access to the wounded. Hospitals are short of medical supplies and intensive care patients' lives are dependent on aging back-up generators. Much of the population is without electricity, about half are without running water, and food deliveries to 750,000 have been seriously disrupted.

On Wednesday Israel began daily three-hour lulls in the fighting to allow Palestinians to leave their homes and stock up on supplies. But the UN said a daily three-hour window would make "no difference" to its operations, because of the scale of the needs.

FOOD

Some 750,000 people - half Gaza's population - are dependent on food hand-outs from the UN relief agency, UNRWA. Distribution has been hampered by security problems. It has said throughout the operation that the supplies it has will last "days, not weeks". Early in the operation, Save the Children said there was a "severe shortage of food". On 6 January, the UN said only nine of Gaza's 47 bakeries were operating because of shortages of flour and cooking gas, causing bread prices to double.

Israel's destruction of smuggling tunnels, used to bring in both weapons and other products, together with the fact that Israeli forces have blocked the main north-south road, has disrupted the flow of other food items.

The World Food Programme said there are shortages of rice, sugar, dairy products, milk, canned foods and fresh meat. And, because of the long-term economic impact of the blockade, plus shortages of bank notes, many Gazans cannot afford to buy much in the first place.

MEDICAL RESOURCES

Gaza's health system is close to collapse, according to the World Health Organization (WHO). Hospitals are overwhelmed and do not have enough intensive care beds or operating theatres, medical workers are exhausted from working round-the-clock, and urgently needed life-saving supplies are piling up at the border, the WHO says. The UN says there are about 2,000 hospital beds in Gaza, including only 164 intensive care beds. Some 3,500 people have been wounded, many with serious injuries.

Fuel supplies for these are "precariously low", the UN said on 8 January. In Shifa hospital, Gaza's largest, some 70 patients' lives depend on machines powered by the generators.

ENERGY

The UN says about two-thirds of Gaza's 1.5m people are without power. Gaza's only power plant, which supplies much of Gaza City, has been shut down since 30 December because it ran out of fuel. As of 9 January, even though a small quantity of fuel had reached the plant, it was unable to operate because of a broken power line in the west of the Strip.

There have been severe shortages of cooking gas for many weeks. The UN says it has received reports of people burning their furniture to bake bread.

WATER AND SANITATION

About half of Gaza's population are without running water, according to Unrwa. This means they are dependent on their own storage tanks, or risking leaving their homes to buy from private water sellers. One Gaza resident told the BBC he and many other people had been forced to resort to drinking water from the toilet.

On Wednesday the World Bank said "nearly all" sewage and water pumps had stopped operating due to fuel and power shortages. It said sewage was flowing into residential areas in the northern areas of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya.

The Bank also warned that an already fragile sewage lagoon in Beit Lahiya could burst because of nearby explosions and the failure of pumps that normally relieve pressure on it, which it said was putting 10,000 people at risk of drowning.

SHELTER

The UN says 21,200 people have fled their homes for shelters set up in UN-run schools, despite the fact that 43 people died when Israel bombed one of these on 7 January.

COMMUNICATIONS

The UN says 80-90% of the mobile telephone network is down, and a "huge number" of landlines are not working because of damage and power cuts." (Excerpts)

CONCLUSION

It appears from the Reut Institute's Document to the Winograd Commission that there is

recognition among Israeli analysts that their National Security framework is clearly in serious trouble. Israel's grossly disproportionate action in Gaza indicates a profound anxiety about the larger security threat that Gaza represents and testifies to Israel's growing sense of vulnerability in the face of what is a deepening problem. Her strategies have sown the seeds of intensifying frustration and anger among Palestinians worldwide and have brought a population of 1.5 million people and another generation of youth to the edge of humanitarian disaster. Her policies and strategies have radicalized and further alienated a growing and more desperate population in her own back yard as well as the larger Muslim World. They have also frustrated her primary ally who must negotiate what is a precarious balance of power and good will in this high-stakes world of global terror, economic interdependence, and potential mass destruction. The result is a greater existential security threat in the region than ever before, one that Israel is increasingly at a loss to address despite her military prowess, a "prowess" which is by many accounts, and perhaps more so now by Reut's account as well, actually a liability in the larger global human security equation.

Add to this analysis a stronger and politically entrenched Hezbollah in Lebanon, sympathetic to a strengthened and radicalized Hamas in Gaza. Consider also the West Bank, in poor economic straits and living under apartheid-like conditions, also sympathetic to Gaza. Consider also a United States with little stomach for another conflict in the Middle East.

Israel must realize that she has orchestrated an administrative nightmare of structural violence, imprisoning and besieging the most densely-populated place on earth and bombed their hospitals, homes, police stations, schools, mosques, relief stations, supply depots, communications and TV stations, killing and injuring thousands of innocent civilians – 47 percent of whom are children and reduced them to starvation.

On January 19, 2009, this quote appeared in the Letters to the Editor of Sydney's Morning Herald:

"Nearly 70 years ago, in a small eastern European city, an oppressed and occupied people were under siege, living under atrocious and brutal conditions, lacking food, medicine, electricity, water, and slowly being strangled in the hope they would just disappear. Warsaw Ghetto 1941 - Gaza 2008. Israel, you are a disgrace." - Zaid Khan

Not only do these messages come from around the world, but many Israelis themselves sense they are in moral crisis. This kind of perpetrator-induced trauma to add to their historic victimization is perhaps the saddest part of this story. I cannot conceive a greater failure of national security and leadership.

The challenge before Israel is how to extricate herself from her inevitable destruction ironically primed by her own misguided politics, intelligence, and power. It is evident the way forward must be to undo the infrastructures of oppression that have disallowed the positive interactive effects of economic justice, development, prosperity, and good will to thrive. Israel must begin to engage the dynamics of "smart power" (Nye and Armitage, 2007) and of a human security framework which integrates the immense and powerful political and economic forces of diplomacy and development along with defense (Schirch).

There are no military solutions here, neither conventional nor strategic (deterrence). Power differentials between oneself and one's adversaries do little in the final analysis to achieve security in the face of perceived injustice. Game theory itself on which military and

deterrence models are predicated breaks down in moral and transcendent worldview frameworks such as is the case here. When one has no justice and little to lose in this life and everything to gain in the next there is no power in deterrence. Injustices and disempowerment simply force resistance into new arenas of contention that circumvent other forms of power.

The answer is in perceiving security as predicated on just social order, the fundamental objective of development – creating a society in which all stakeholders coexist equitably and share in a perceived legitimate and democratic form and process of governance. Security and peace lie in the fundamental arts of diplomacy and development to achieve socio-economic justice.

References

Anderson, Mary B., (1999) *Do No Harm: How Aid can Support Peace and War*, Boulder, Co:Lynne Rienner Publishers

Anderson, Mary, (2004), *Do No Harm Reflections on the Impacts of International Assistance Provided to the Occupied Territories*, Retrieved from <http://www.jerusalemities.org/reports/8.htm> 1/9/09

Desanto, Lindlade, and Paloma (1990) “Paradigms of Development: Introduction” in *Christian Perspectives on Social Problems*, Indianapolis, IN: Wesley Press

Development as a Security Strategy (n.d.) Retrieved from http://www.3dsecurity.org/development_as_strategy

Halpern, David (2005) *Social Capital*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Jantzi, Terrence and Jantzi, Vernon, (n.d.) “Local Program Theory and the Development Paradigms: Creating a Space for Practitioner Dialogue on Embedded Assumptions in Development and Peacebuilding”

Maoz, Zeev, (2006) *Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security & Foreign Policy*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006

Narayan, Deepa, (2000) *Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices of the Poor*, New York: Oxford University Press

Nye, Joseph and Armitage, Richard (2007) *Center for Strategic and International Studies Commission on Smart Power Report*, Washington, DC: CSIS Press

Reut's Document to the Winograd Committee (2007) Reut Institute, Retrieved from:

<http://reut-institute.org/Data/Uploads/PDFVer/20070427%20-%20Winograd%20-%20Update%20national%20security.pdf> January 8, 2009

Schirch, Lisa, (2004), *The Little Book of Strategic Peacebuilding, a Vision and Framework for Peace with Justice*, Intercourse, PA: Good Books

Sharp, Heather, (2009), "The Humanitarian Crisis Deepens", article for British Broadcasting Corporation, retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7812295.stm January 16, 2009

The National Security Strategy – March 2006 Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-060316.htm> January 8, 2009

Water and Security in Israel The International Development Research Center, Retrieved from http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-29781-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html January 12, 2009

World Bank site:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/WESTBANKGAZ>

[AEXTN/0,,menuPK:294370~pagePK:141159~piPK:141110~theSitePK:294365,00.html](http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionVII.html)

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionVII.html>

Endnotes

¹ See Desanto, Lindlade, and Paloma (1990) “Paradigms of Development: Introduction” in *Christian Perspectives on Social Problems*, for an overview of these paradigms.

² I want to acknowledge my indebtedness in this paper to the conceptual and theoretical work of my professor and mentor, Lisa Schirch who has pioneered the 3D Security Initiative, a policy think tank in Washington DC promoting an understanding of the interdependent roles of diplomacy, development, and defense in human and national security and foreign policy. I am drawing heavily in this paper from her analysis and want to refer my readers to <http://www.3dsecurity.org> for a broader articulation of these premises and their theoretical framework.

³ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-060316-07.htm> (retrieved 1/8/09). The Monterrey Consensus was drafted by the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Division of Sustainable Development

⁴ Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/Monterrey_Consensus.htm 1/8/09

⁵ Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/Monterrey_Consensus.htm 1/8/09

⁶ *Development as a Security Strategy* (n.d.) Retrieved from http://www.3dsecurity.org/development_as_strategy

⁷ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-060316-02.htm> (Retrieved 1/8/09)

⁸ <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/nss-060316-06.htm> (Retrieved 1/8/09)

⁹ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/print/sectionVII.html> (Retrieved 1/8/09)

¹⁰ See Elias Chacour’s “Blood Brothers” (1939, 1984), New Jersey: Flemington H Revell for a personal narrative.

¹¹ Parenthetically, this model of socialistic community organization was a key reason in my view for Israel’s rather remarkable rise through the stages of development to the place it occupies now in the global economy. The kibbutz model is fundamentally one of “growth-with-equity,” beginning with intermediate technologies and with an orientation toward the common good of the community and the larger society, it grew in its sophistication in time toward its own vision of becoming an equal player in the modernized global marketplace. The growing pains in this regard have not been smooth or easy as state ownership has ultimately been selectively given over to private enterprise as Israel’s industrial sectors required this to compete. As such I believe Israel represents a fascinating case study and model for development.

¹² Reut Institute is an Israeli think tank established in January 2004 as a non-partisan, nonprofit policy analysis team serving the Israeli government exclusively. Focusing on matters of National Security and “Top 15 Socio-Economics” the team is highly regarded according to government spokespersons who indicate that virtually all key ministries utilize Reut services. “The Reut Institute’s Vision and Mission” - as codified in [Reut’s constitution](#), includes the ff: “The Reut Institute is a Zionist organization. Our vision deals with the existence, security and quality of the State of Israel: a state whose existence is secured and whose citizens are safe; a prosperous state that is a leading nation in terms of quality of life; a state that is Jewish in character and in makeup, offering a qualitative Jewish experience that is distinctly Israeli at the heart of the Jewish world; a democratic state, which embraces universal humanistic values and aspires to create a society that sets an example for the family of nations. [...]In accordance with the principles of *Tikkun Olam* being “a light unto the nations,” the Reut Institute is obligated to aid humanity face its challenges. It is within our abilities to make a meaningful impact on humanity that will echo the unique values and abilities of the State of Israel and the Jewish people.”

¹³ The Winograd Committee is the Israeli “commission of inquiry into the events of military engagement in Lebanon 2006”

¹⁴ Reut’s Document to the Winograd Committee <http://reut-institute.org/Data/Uploads/PDFVer/20070427%20-%20Winograd%20-%20Update%20national%20security.pdf> (Retrieved 1/8/09)

¹⁵ Taken from World Bank Economic Monitoring Reports May and September, 2008, retrieved from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/> 1/4/09

¹⁶ (when revised to exclude relief remittances and food aid, according to the World Bank report of Sept 2008)

¹⁷ (according to the World Bank assessment Sept 2008)

¹⁸ “The Israeli policy of reduction of fuel supplies as a response to continued attacks on Israel began on October 28th, 2007. Between January and September 2007, approximately 18 million liters of fuel were imported per month. This dropped by about 25% in November 2007, 14% in December, 20% in January 2008, 38% in February, and 25% in March. In February 2008, gasoline (diesel) dropped by approximately 67% and benzene steeply dropped by about 80%.” (Source: World Bank, 2008)

¹⁹ “UNRWA/WFP analysis on the use of the six crossings between Israel and the West Bank estimates that more trucks and staff will be needed in the future to transport the same amount of humanitarian goods, adding approximately \$3.9 per metric ton for transport. This excludes other costs, including going through the back-to-back procedures that requires off-loading, scanning of loads, and reloading onto a truck...[as well as] the vast demurrage costs incurred by the UN agencies as a result of lengthy delays in clearing and permitting the entry of shipments to the Gaza Strip. Since June 2007, UNRWA and the WFP have incurred at least \$4 million in storage, demurrage, transportation and palletization costs for imports to Gaza.” (Source: World Bank, 2008)

²⁰ *Do No Harm Reflections on the Impacts of International Assistance Provided to the Occupied Territories, Report of Visit from May 9-17, 2004* by Mary Anderson, Executive Director, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Retrieved from <http://www.jerusalemities.org/reports/8.htm> 1/9/09